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Abstract
In the context of an emission trading scheme (ETS ), we study how
uncertainty over the environmental policy affects firms’ investment in
low-carbon technologies. We develop a three period sequential model
that combines the industry and the electricity sectors and encompasses
both irreversible and reversible investment possibilities for the firms.
Additionally, we explicitly model the policy uncertainty in the regula-
tor’s objective function as well as the market interactions that give rise
to an endogenous price of permits. We find that uncertainty reduces
irreversible investment and that the availability of both reversible and
irreversible technologies partially eliminates the positive effect of policy
uncertainty on reversible technology found in previous literature. Fur-
thermore, we provide a framework that allows to assess the efficiency
of different implementations of the scheme.
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1 Introduction
Environmental issues have become a top priority due to the recent awareness
of global natural constraints, and many policies have been developed to stim-
ulate a more sustainable usage of resources. At a global governance level,
the instruments chosen to reach sustainability and reduction of greenhouse
gases (GHG) consist of market-based mechanisms such as emissions trad-
ing. Currently, the biggest Emission Trading Scheme is the European one
(EU ETS ). An Emission Trading Scheme (ETS ) is a cap-and-trade system
designed to create incentives for firms to invest in low-carbon technology,
with the final goal of reducing carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. In practice,
by allocating a certain amount of tradable emission permits for each of the
energy-intensive installations covered by the scheme, the ETS places a limit
on total CO2 emissions. This system creates a market for these permits
so that, given that firms have different marginal costs of abatement, some
installations find it profitable to reduce their emissions and sell the unused
allowances. This aggregate limit, or cap, and consequently the allocation
of permits per each installation, is set by a regulatory authority periodi-
cally and at a decreasing rate. The periodicity of the cap decision allows
the policy makers to update the limit according to the realized technology
innovation path, to the actual investment process by firms and to possible
government changes or priority revisions due to business cycles. Although
this system entails a flexibility gain for the authority, it also leads to uncer-
tainty over the future cap and the future market price of the allowances for
the firms. As a consequence, given the long-term nature of investments in
low-carbon technologies, the return on investment in abatement is also un-
known at the time of investing. Thus, how does uncertainty over the policy
decisions, driven by the periodicity of the cap, affect firms’ investment in
low-carbon technologies? More specifically, is the ETS efficient when firms
do not know future levels of the cap?
1.1 Literature
Previous literature has attempted to address similar questions. Blyth, Bradley,
Bunn, Clarke, Wilson, and Yang (2007) study how environmental policy
uncertainty affects power sector investment in low carbon technology. Fol-
lowing the Real Option Theory, they develop a model of firm investment
where firms can choose among different investments that are all irreversible.
According to what the theory predicts,1 they find that uncertainty over
1See Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
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the price of permits, i.e., the process that drives the future flow of prof-
its, decreases irreversible investment. However this analysis presents several
limitations. First of all, policy uncertainty is represented as an exogenous
shock over the price of permits. This setting (an exogenous price and the
absence of a policy objective function) rules out any consideration of the
feedback effect from the firms to the policy maker, which is important from
a policy design perspective. Secondly, it concerns only a portfolio choice:
that is, the firms’ production is held fixed, which eliminates a potential in-
strument to deal with future uncertainty. Finally, it focuses only on one of
the sectors of the EU ETS, the power sector, and only one possible kind of
investment in low-carbon technology - the irreversible one.
According to Shapiro and Varian (1999), a technology investment is compa-
rable to an option when switching costs are high and therefore a technology
lock-in effect comes into play. Namely, firms find themselves having little or
no flexibility to switch to other technology solutions once they have imple-
mented one of them. We extend this definition to the case when switching
costs are not extremely high but firms simply do not find profitable to switch
back to previous technology solution after having invested in new one. Fol-
lowing this extended definition, we can distinguish two kinds of investment
specific to the power sector: an irreversible one, which means that once in
place, it has to be used in production - such as renewable energy resources
or energy efficiency - and a reversible one, which means that if the invest-
ment was made, the firm can still decide whether to use this technology for
production or not - as is the case of fuel switching.
Differentiating between these two options is of vital importance for this
research. In fact, in the analysis by Chen and Tseng (2011), reversible in-
vestment is found to increase with uncertainty. The investment they refer
to takes the form of building up a gas plant, which allows power companies
to use gas for production when the price of coal (the input cost plus the per-
mit price) is higher than the gas price and vice-versa (fuel switching). This
investment provides electricity generators with a precautionary instrument
that helps to hedge the fuel price risk, and, therefore, the higher the uncer-
tainty, the more they are inclined to build gas plants. However, the same
criticisms made of Blyth, Bradley, Bunn, Clarke, Wilson, and Yang (2007)
can be directed at this contribution. Here, uncertainty comes from the price
of the permits and from fuel prices, leaving the regulatory part exogenous to
the model. Moreover, the production is fixed, so there is only a substitution
effect. And, finally, it considers only the power sector in isolation, with only
one type of investment possibility - which, under the Shapiro and Varian
(1999) definition, is the reversible one.
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Colla, Germain, and Van Steenberghe (2012) take a step further in model-
ing this market, by introducing an objective function for the authority and
endogenizing the price of the permits. They study the optimal environmen-
tal policy for the EU ETS in the presence of speculators in the market for
allowances. However, in their setting, firms are homogeneous, with only the
choice of irreversible investment, and uncertainty regards future demand for
the firms’ product, and not the policy rule.
1.2 Our Contribution
As in previous literature, we consider the current set up of the EU ETS as
representative of a general ETS.2 In this environment we propose combin-
ing uncertainty over the policy rule with both possibilities of reversible and
irreversible investment. We therefore put forward a stylized but comprehen-
sive setting where the two sectors regulated by the EU ETS, industry and
electricity, have access to different low-carbon technologies. Industries have
access only to an irreversible clean technology. On the other hand, power
companies may use both an irreversible clean technology and a reversible
technology, namely fuel switching: electricity generation firms can construct
a gas plant but they still have the option to produce with the previously
existing coal plant.3 We explore the final effect of the interaction of these
firms in the market in terms of aggregate investment. For this purpose,
we develop a three-period sequential model. In the first period, two firms,
representative of the two sectors, decide whether to invest in CO2 abating
technologies; in the second period, uncertainty over the relative preference
of the authority over economic activity versus environmental concerns is re-
alized and the regulator chooses the aggregate cap. Finally, firms decide on
their production and fuels and the permits market clears.
To the best of our knowledge, no other model has put together both carbon-
intensive industries and electricity generators, which is essential to capture
the final behavior of the aggregate level of investment - both reversible and
irreversible - in low-carbon technology. We also allow for output effects in
addition to substitution effects, by letting the firms decide on production
2Appendix A provides a description of the EU ETS to the extent relevant for the
purpose of this analysis and explains the concept of policy uncertainty in this context. For
further information regarding the EU ETS see Ellerman, Convery, Perthuis, and Alberola
(2010) and Chevallier (2011).
3Irreversible clean technologies may refer to technologies which improve energy ef-
ficiency or, for power plants, to renewable energy sources (wind, solar, geothermal or
biomass). We exclude the reversible technology possibility for the industry sector as it is
not a feasible option for industrial production.
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levels. Additionally, we clearly identify the uncertainty parameter in the
regulator’s objective function as the relative weight the authority puts on
environmental concerns. This provides us with a feedback effect, since the
regulator internalizes the effect of her choices on firms’ investment decisions.
Moreover, the political nature of uncertainty allows us to derive important
policy implications regarding commitment incentives by policy makers. This
is because this type of uncertainty can be directly influenced by the author-
ity, as opposed, for instance, to demand uncertainty. Finally, our formula-
tion allows to derive a closed form solution and therefore to clearly identify
the effects of the different forces that play a role in this complex picture.
Our model can thus be used as a benchmark to further include additional
features of interest of the different ETS and study how the outcome varies
with them.
Our results show that, given a balanced proportion of the two regulated sec-
tors and an uncertainty process that follows a mean preserving spread, any
degree of policy uncertainty, driven by the impossibility for the authority to
fully determine ex ante the future values of the cap, decreases aggregate ir-
reversible investment. Regarding reversible technology, if the policy makers
are more environmentally concerned, uncertainty always reduces investment.
When they are strongly biased towards the economic activity, however, un-
certainty might increase investment in reversible technology, since it creates
an option value for investing. This positive effect is partially nullified by the
interplay with the irreversible technology.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model while
section 3 presents the methodology and the results. Finally, Section 4 con-
cludes and sets the path for future research.
2 The Model
We develop a model of three sequential periods, which encompasses the key
elements of a cap-and-trade system. As in the actual market for permits,
firms have to decide on their investment strategy before knowing with cer-
tainty the future amount of permits they will be entitled to. Once the cap
is set and firms decide on their production levels, the price is endogenously
determined by the interplay of firms’ supply and demand of allowances. We
abstract both from temporal trading and speculation, which allows us to
focus on the direct market interactions between the firms and the regulator.
For the same reason, we do not include demand side effects, by assuming
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that firms can always sell their production at a constant price. The model
considers three different agents: a regulatory authority, or policy maker, and
one firm from each of the two regulated sectors (industries and electricity
producers). Given the large number of installations covered by this type of
schemes (the EU ETS covers around 11 300 energy-intensive installations
from 30 countries), and the fact that the allowances are traded on electronic
platforms, it is difficult for any particular firm to exert significant market
power in the market for permits. Therefore, we assume perfect competition
amongst firms in this market.4 Furthermore, we assume a continuum of
homogeneous firms within each sector and therefore consider only a repre-
sentative firm from each. This implies, in particular, that the price that
prevails in the market will be determined, in our model, as the result of the
interaction of the two firms, because it represents the actions taken by the
entire market. Finally, all agents are risk neutral.
2.1 The regulator
As laid out in the introduction, we focus on the effect of having uncertainty
over the policy maker’s preferences. Although a long term target for the
cap is set out in advance, the policy maker decides period by period on the
actual limit in effect for that given trading period (phase), which might be
tighter or looser than the average, according to the importance she puts in
environmental concerns versus economic outcomes. This difference in pref-
erences might derive from priority revisions resulting from business cycles,5
unexpected changes in the technological innovation path, different political
preferences of changing governments, or even the presence and influence of
political lobbies. Considering that a standard payoff period for a low-carbon
investment is between 15 and 20 years, when firms make their investment
decisions, their payoff is uncertain - particularly, investment in low-carbon
technology is more profitable if the forthcoming emission cap is tighter, and
vice-versa.
Evidence of policy uncertainty in the context of the EU ETS is presented
in the following figure. It depicts the information available to the firms in
2003 and the realized cap for the first and the second trading periods. In
4This is true even though allowances are not distributed equally amongst firms: in
the EU ETS, power companies receive a much higher share of allowances. However, the
model can be extended to include some market power amongst the firms in the electricity
generating sector.
5In particular, whenever there is an economic recession, the government in power might
choose to loosen the cap, so as to bolster the economy.
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Figure 1: Annual aggregate cap as known in 2003. Source: European Com-
mission.
fact, in 2003 firms were aware of the aggregate cap level for the first trading
period (2005-2007) and they had expectations on the second phase cap (the
dashed line). In 2007 the European Commission announced a second-phase
cap significantly lower than the expected one due to the unforeseen over-
allocation of the first phase. The difference between the expected cap for
2008-2012 (dashed line) and the realized one (the full line) proves evidence
of the uncertainty around the future values of policy parameter, namely the
aggregate cap.
We model this uncertainty through a parameter, γ˜, measuring the weight
put by the policy maker on economic expansion, proxied by the firms’ prof-
its, while (1 − γ˜) is the weight put on the disutility from CO2 emissions.
This preference parameter can take two values:
γ˜ =
{
γ + τ with probability q
γ − τ with probability (1− q)
It can be high with probability q, or low with probability (1 − q). Firms
know the value of q, γ and τ , but they do not know the exact realization of
γ˜ a priori, namely when they make their investment decisions. This value
becomes known by the firms only in the second period, when uncertainty is
realized. The regulator sets the cap so as to maximize the following objec-
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tive function:
R(e¯; γ˜) = γ˜
[
2∑
i=1
pii
]
− (1− γ˜)φe¯ (1)
where
2∑
i=1
pii is the sum of the profits of the two representative firms and
φe is the damage function that represents the disutility from CO2 emis-
sions, as described in Scott (1994) and Germain, Steenberghe, and Magnus
(2004). This function consists of a parameter, φ, which quantifies not only
the marginal immediate damage of CO2 emissions for the ozone layer, but
also comprises a measure of their long-run social and economic cost, due to
climate change,6 and e, the cap set by the policy maker, which therefore
corresponds to the total amount of CO2 emitted by firms. We assume that
the damage is linear in the emissions, so that the parameter represents their
actual marginal cost.7 In principle, tightening the cap has two effects: a
substitution effect, as firms substitute from the carbon-intensive input to-
wards cleaner technologies, and an output effect, because firms might find
it profitable to decrease their production in order to decrease emissions.
2.2 The firms
We consider two representative firms: firm 1, from the power sector, and
firm 2, from the industrial sector.8 They differ in their productivity, αi, their
available choice of fuels, and their cost of investment in clean technologies,
measured by ki. In particular, the firm in the electricity sector may choose
to invest among two types of low-carbon technologies:
• An irreversible clean technology (such as renewable energy sources,
RES, or energy efficiency enhancing technologies) which we consider
irreversible, since after investment takes place the firm is locked-in to
its use.9
6Such as the damage from the intensification of natural disasters, the decrease in clean
water resources, or migration and restructuring due to the sea level rise.
7A linear damage function has been used in similar analyses (see, for example, Scott
(1994) and Colla, Germain, and Van Steenberghe (2012)).
8For now, we assume throughout that both sectors have the same size. However, the
model can easily be extended to include different shares among sectors.
9Regarding RES, since there are nearly no operating costs, once these investments take
place, the firm always uses them.
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• An irreversible technology, namely fuel switching in production, which
requires building a second plant that produces using gas,10 and paying
a fixed cost, F . However, once the investment is made and uncertainty
over the cap is resolved, the firm has the opportunity to switch back
to the coal-using plant, if the realized cap was higher than the ex-
pected, given that operating costs of coal are always lower than those
of gas. We assume that both plants are big enough so that the com-
pany operates with only one of them at a time according to the merit
order. Accordingly, we consider the availability to switch between fu-
els a reversible technology. The investment decision is of a discrete
nature: to build or not the new gas plant. We consider this option
a low-carbon technology because gas releases only around 80% of the
amount of CO2 emitted by coal. This coupled with the fact that lower
amounts of fuel are necessary, since the productivity of gas is usually
much higher, leads to a much lower total level of emissions from pro-
duction. The relevance of gas as energy source for power companies is
illustrated in the table in Appendix B.
On the contrary, firm 2 has only the option to invest in the irreversible
clean technology.11 Both clean technologies are continuous variables.
The firms’ profit functions can be described as:
pi1(a1, e1, G1; e¯) = max{pi1,e(a1, e1; e¯), pi1,G(a1, G1; e¯)} (2)
pi1,e(a1, e1; e¯) = α1,e(a1 + a¯)e1 − ce21 − p(e¯)
(
e1 − e¯
2
)
− k1a21 (3)
pi1,G(a1, G1; e¯) = α1,G(a1 + a¯)G1 − gG21 − p(e¯)
(
λG1 − e¯
2
)
− k1a21 − F (4)
for firm 1, where the profit will be the maximum between the profit using
coal for production and the profit using gas for production, and
pi2,e(a2, e2; e¯) = α2,e(a2 + a¯)e2 − ce22 − p(e¯)
(
e2 − e¯
2
)
− k2a22 (5)
for firm 2. Each firm has a two-input production function, where one of
them is a fossil fuel - coal (e2), for firm 2, and coal (e1) or gas (G1) for firm
10Almost all the existing coal plants burn pulverized coal in a boiler to generate steam
which then drives a steam turbine. Replacing the existent coal-burners to burn gas would
reduce consistently the efficiency of the gas plant. For instance, a retrofit gas plant would
have an average of 37% efficiency whereas a new CCGT has on average 58% efficiency.
Therefore almost all the companies build a new gas plant.
11For example, a cooling system installed in a cement installation.
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1 - and the other is clean technology - a2 for firm 2 and a1 for firm 1. Our
measure of coal has a one to one correspondence with carbon dioxide (CO2).
We assume fossil fuels and clean technology as inputs complements and for
mathematical tractability we consider a multiplicative production function.
This complementarity is justified by technological considerations.12 Given
that the profit is expressed in monetary terms, these functions imply that
the firms’ profits are given by the revenues from their sales,13 minus the
costs of using gas or coal, which consist of the operating costs of the inputs
plus the permits trading cost, and minus investment costs. The productiv-
ity of the combination of the inputs, which includes the price of the output,
is given by αi. Due to their physical properties α1,G > α1,e. Moreover, a¯
represents the existing level of clean technologies for the two sectors. This
formulation allows firms to set the level of investment in clean technology
to zero, if optimal, still having a positive production level. We assume the
same a for both sectors.
We assume convex costs of coal and gas, which assures that the profit func-
tions are concave in the production inputs. The concave structure captures
not only the price of the fuels, but also the storage costs of these inputs,
as well as their opportunity cost - both of which increase exponentially for
high quantities of fuels. Because the price of gas is historically on average
higher than the price of coal, we also consider g > c.
The second part of the profit concerns the permit trading part which is
the net demand for permits ((e − e/2) or (λG − e/2)) multiplied by the
endogenous permits price (p(e)), which is a function of the total amount
of allowances (e). The cap is assumed to be shared equally amongst the
firms,14 and λ is the proportion of CO2 emitted by one unit of gas, as com-
pared to that of one unit of coal. If the net demand is positive, the firm
is emitting more than what it is entitled to, and therefore is a net buyer
of allowances. On the contrary, if a firm manages to decrease its emission
level below its allocation of permits, then it is a net seller in the market for
allowances.
Finally, kia
2
i is the cost of investing in the irreversible technology. We as-
12Renewables are intermittent energy resources and very difficult or costly to store,
hence the aggregate supply of electricity always uses a mix of fossil fuels and RES. EF, on
the other hand, are investments that make these fuels more productive, by reducing the
energy wasted during the cycle, and must, therefore, always be used along with the latter.
13Since we assumed that firms can always sell their output.
14The ex-ante allocation does not affect efficiency, as the permit trading reallocates
them efficiently; what matters is the aggregate level.
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sume, as it is standard in the literature,15 that the cost of investing in this
technology is convex.
2.3 Timing
The agents’ actions take place as follows: in the first period, the two firms
make their investment decisions, according to their expectation of the forth-
coming cap; in the second period uncertainty is realized and the policy maker
decides on the aggregate amount of permits, by maximizing her objective
function; and in the last period, firms set their production levels, so as to
maximize profits, by adjusting their fuel choices. They trade permits and
the market clears, giving rise to the equilibrium price of allowances. This
timeline is set out in Fig.2.
Firm 1: a1,
build,not build}
t = 1 t = 3t = 2
Firm 2: a2
Regulator: e Firm 1: e1, G1,
{switch,not switch}
Firm 2: e2
t
Market
clears: 
p(e)
Figure 2: Timeline
3 Methodology and Results
In order to better isolate the mechanisms in effect, we first explore two
reduced settings: one where only the irreversible investment (the choice of
ai) is available, which means that firms can improve their energy efficiency or
invest in RES, and the alternative situation where only reversible investment
for the electricity sector - investment in a gas plant - can be made.
15After the seminal contribution of Montgomery (1972), several papers have assumed
convex abatement costs - for example, Fell and Morgenstern (2009).
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3.1 Irreversible Investment in Isolation
We start with the first case. When only irreversible investment is available,
the firms’ profit functions reduce to:
pii,e,s(e, a; e¯s) = αi,e(ai+ a¯)ei,s−ce2i,s−p(e¯s)
(
ei − e¯s
2
)
−kia2i i = 1, 2; s = h, l
(6)
where s stands for the realization of the state, which can be high (γ˜h = γ+τ)
or low (γ˜l = γ − τ). In this reduced setting firms differ only on their pro-
ductivity, αi and their cost of abatement parameter, ki.
We solve the model by backward induction. In t = 3, after the cap has
been set and uncertainty is revealed, the firms decide on their output levels
by adjusting their fuel (which consists here of coal, ei), according to the
observed cap. They do so by maximizing their last period profit, given by
(6) net of sunk costs, with respect to the coal level, taking the price, the
allocation and their first period choices as given. The resulting optimal level
of coal is, then, given by:
e∗i,s(ps) =
−ps + αi(ai + a¯)
2c
(7)
for i = 1, 2; s = h, l, where the star indicates an equilibrium level and
ps = p(e¯s). This optimal quantity depends positively on the productivity
parameter αi,e, on the investment in clean technology ai, and on its starting
level a¯. This happens because the marginal productivity of ei is given by
αi,e(ai + a¯), which makes the complementarity effect between inputs to be
larger than the substitution effect.16 Lastly, the optimal coal level depends
negatively on the price for permits, ps, and on the parameter measuring
operating costs, c.
The two firms then exchange permits, according to their production
needs, and the market clears. The equilibrium price is given by the following
market clearing condition, for each of the two s states:
e∗1,s(ps) + e
∗
2,s(ps) = e¯s (8)
which, solving for ps, gives us the price that clears the market:
p∗s(e¯s) =
1
2
[α1(a1 + a¯) + α2(a2 + a¯)− 2ce¯s] (9)
16This is true for any other choice of production function which embodies any (even
very small) degree of complementarity between inputs.
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This price depends negatively on e¯s and c, and positively on the average pro-
ductivity of coal. Intuitively, increases in the productivity of coal boost the
demand for permits, thereby increasing its price. On the contrary, a decrease
in operational costs c diminishes coal demand and consequently reduces the
allowances’ price. Finally, increases in the total amount of available permits
e¯s reduce their price, and vice-versa. This negative relation between e¯s and
p∗s means, in particular, that the price level associated with γ˜h, ph, will be
lower (or equal) than that associated with γ˜l, pl.
Next, we study the policy maker’s behavior. In t = 2, she chooses the cap
by maximizing her objective function, according to her type s, taking into
account her effect on the firms’ last period choices. Her objective function
is given by:
Rs(e¯s) = γ˜s
[
2∑
i=1
pii(ai, e
∗
i ; e¯)
]
− (1− γ˜s)φes (10)
where firms’ profits are given by (8), substituting in the equilibrium values
e∗i,s.
The resulting equilibrium cap is a function only of the parameters describing
the economy and ai:
e¯∗s =
(a1 + a¯)α1γ˜s + (a2 + a¯)α2γ˜s + 2φ(γ˜s − 1)
2cγ˜s
, s = h, l (11)
The optimal cap e¯∗s depends positively on the weight the regulator puts
on the economy, γ˜s, and negatively on the marginal damage of emissions,
φ, since γ˜s − 1 > 0. Re-arranging the expression, it can be seen that the
existence of a positive cap is guaranteed by the following maximum for the
marginal damage parameter:
φ <
γ
(1− γ)
1
2
[α1(a1 + a¯) + α2(a2 + a¯)] (12)
which means the marginal damage has to be smaller than the average coal
productivity in the market weighted by the relative preference of the regu-
lator for the economy. As in Colla, Germain, and Van Steenberghe (2012),
if the marginal damage of emissions is too large, the regulator is better
off setting the cap to zero and having no production (and zero emissions).
Therefore, for the rest of the analysis, we assume that φ is smaller than the
threshold, and incorporate this condition in the following maximizations.
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Finally, we study firms’ investment decision in the first period. In t = 1,
firms face uncertainty regarding the policy maker’s preference parameter
γ˜,17 and, therefore regarding the cap and the market price for permits. They
expect, with probability q, that the regulator is of a high type (i.e., more
concerned about the economy), and therefore sets the associated cap, e¯h,
and with probability (1− q) that she is of a low type (more environmentally
biased), and thus sets the associated cap, e¯l.
18 Therefore, they choose their
investment levels by maximizing the following expected profit function with
respect to ai:
E(pii,e(ai; e¯)|γ, τ, q) = q[αi,e(ai + a¯)e∗i,h − ce∗2i,h − p(e¯h)(e∗i,h −
e¯h
2
)− kia2i t]
+ (1− q)[αi,e(ai + a¯)e∗i,l − ce∗2i,l − p(e¯l)((e∗i,l −
el
2
)− kia2i ]
i = 1, 2 (13)
In doing so, for each of the two states they take into account the last period
optimal levels of coal, the prices and the caps. Solving the first order con-
ditions for ai, we get the optimum investment level in clean technology, as
a function of the expected price:
a∗i (ph, pl) =
α1[a¯α1 − qph − (1− q)pl]
4ck1 − α21
Substituting in the equilibrium price we have:
a∗i =
(αi,e(−α2j,e ˆ¯e+ 2kj [a(αi,e − αj,e) + 2cˆ¯e]))
16ckikj − 2
(
kjα2i,e + kiα
2
j,e
) (14)
for i = 1, 2, j = 3 − i, where ˆ¯e = [qe¯h + (1 − q)e¯l]. This quantity is always
positive as long as the following two conditions are maintained:
4cki − α2i,e > 0, i = 1, 2 (15)
[qeh + (1− q)el] ≥ −2kj a¯(αi − αj)
(4ck2 − α2j )
(16)
17Although γ and τ are common knowledge, firms do not know whether the realization
of γ˜ will be high or low.
18Although firms act as price takers and do not take into account their own effect on
the price or the cap, they can assess exactly how these depend on the policy maker’s
preferences. So, they associate with each state s a certain level of permits, e¯s, and price
p(e¯s).
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for i = 1, 2, j = 3 − i. The first condition regards the comparison be-
tween marginal costs and marginal productivity of ai and ei. The second
one means that for a∗i to be non-negative the expected cap cannot be too
tight. This is because under such a cap level firms are better off setting ei
to zero, and consequently not producing. As long as these conditions are
maintained, existence and uniqueness of a∗i and e
∗
i are guaranteed.
The derivative of a∗i with respect to the expected cap, [qeh + (1− q)el], is
always positive under the first condition. This effect takes place due to the
complementarity with ei, and means that also a
∗
i depends negatively on the
price of ei,s. However, these effects are larger for e
∗
i,s than for a
∗
i , so that
the clean technology to coal ratio actually increases with increases in the
price.19 Additionally, a∗i depends negatively on ki, so that the firm with
lower costs of abatement invests more in equilibrium, and vice-versa.
Substituting the equilibrium cap in the optimal levels of inputs and vice-
versa, we find that both inputs increase with an increase in γ˜s and decrease
with increases in φ, which carries over from their effect on the cap. The same
substitution in conditions (12) and (16) shows (12) is always more binding,
so that we take only this one. Thus, the conditions guaranteeing existence
and uniqueness of non-negative equilibrium quantities are the following:
Condition 1
4cki − α2i,e > 0, i = 1, 2
Condition 2
φ ≤ a¯α(γ
2 − τ2)
γ − τ(1− 2q)− (γ2 − τ2)
where α = min{α1, α2}.
We finally investigate the effect of uncertainty on investment in clean
technology. We do so by studying the effect of an increase in the spread
of γ˜s, which essentially means an increase in τ . We first assume that un-
certainty follows a mean preserving spread (MPS) process, so that each of
the possible states occurs with the same probability (i.e., q = 12). Com-
paring the optimal values of ai in the case of full information (τ = 0) with
those of uncertainty (τ 6= 0), we find the that both at an aggregate level
(A =
∑2
i=1 ai) and at installation levels investment is always lower in the
19Similar to the workings of the capital to labor ratio in most production functions.
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latter case. Additionally, we find that
∂a∗i
∂τ < 0, so that the investment levels
monotonically decrease with uncertainty. This result is perfectly in line with
the predictions of the Real Option Theory and derives from the fact that
a higher level of irreversible investment implies less flexibility to deal with
future uncertainty. Lastly, we consider a non-MPS, and find that, whenever
q < 12 the results are maintained, and for q >
1
2 , they only change whenever
τ > τˆ = γ(2q − 1). This means that increases in τ only have a positive
effect on irreversible investment for the particular case where the probabil-
ity that the realization is γ˜h = (γ + τ) is very high, so that increases in τ
mean increases in the average cap. Our results so far are summarized in the
following propositions.
Proposition 1 If the stochastic process follows a mean-preserving spread,
irreversible investment is always lower under uncertainty than with full in-
formation, both at an aggregate level and at an installation level. Moreover,
the higher the uncertainty, the lower the the investment.
Proposition 2 If the stochastic process does not follow a mean-preserving
spread, and q < 12 the results are maintained. If q >
1
2 , irreversible invest-
ment is lower in than in the certainty case if and only if τ > τˆ .
3.2 Reversible Investment in Isolation
In the second scenario we explore, firms do not have the option of investing
in the irreversible technology, but the electricity generating company may
take advantage of fuel switching. In this case, firm 1 and firm 2’s profit
functions are given by equations (2) to (5) setting ai to zero.
20 The profits
when using coal and gas for production are, respectively, given by:
pii,e(ei; e¯) = αi,eei − ce2i − p(e¯)
(
ei − e
2
)
, i = 1, 2 (17)
pi1,G(G1; e¯) = α1,GG1 − gG21 − p(e¯)
(
λG1 − e¯
2
)
− F (18)
Since this problem involves not only continuous decisions (the optimal levels
of ei and G1), but also discrete choices by firm 1 (whether to invest in the
20Since a¯ is fixed, it becomes just an increase in productivity. So, we can set it to 1
without loss of generality, leaving the firms with a one-input production function.
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gas plant in t = 1 and which plant to use in t = 3) we follow a somewhat
different methodology for solving it.
To begin with, we distinguish the possible behavior of the electricity
company, with respect to its discrete choices. While with full information
(i.e. price and cap known in t = 1) the power company invests in the new
plant only if in the last period it is profitable to use gas instead of coal, under
uncertainty this condition is maintained only under certain values of the
fundamentals (τ , γ and φ). For other values, however, the company might
not find it profitable to actually use gas, after having invested, depending
of the realization of γ˜. In the latter case, if the regulator is more biased
towards the environment (γ˜ = γ˜l), the cap is tighter, the permits’ price is
higher and, for given fuel prices, it is more profitable for the firm to produce
by using gas, which requires it to hold a lower quantity of permits.21 On
the contrary, if the regulator is more willing to boost the economic activity
γ˜ = γ˜h, the cap is higher, the allowances’ price is lower, and the firm prefers
to use the option to switch back to coal, given that c < g. Consequently,
we distinguish between three possible cases, which correspond to the two
discrete decisions of firm 1:
• Case 1 (NI): Firm 1 does not invest;
• Case 2 (INS): Firm 1 invests and never switches;
• Case 3 (IS): Firm 1 invests and{
switches if γ˜ = γ˜h
does not switch if γ˜ = γ˜l
Note what differentiates the last two cases are the fundamentals, namely
the values of γ,τ and q, which are known by all agents from the first period,
while what matters for the switching decision of the firm in the third case
is particular realization of γ˜. We start by studying the two investment con-
ditions: one assuming the fundamentals are such that firm 1 never switches
after having invested - and so we compare firm 1’s profit in the first two cases
(INS versus NI ); and another assuming that firm 1 might switch after the
investment - for which we perform the comparison between firm 1’s profit
in third and first cases (IS versus NI ).
The most interesting case, however, is the latter, since it involves the situa-
tion where the firm switches and takes advantage of the reversibility of the
21Recall from Section II that gas emits less CO2 than coal and it is also more productive.
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technology. Thus, we assume the conditions are such that if the firm invests,
it will switch to coal when γ˜ = γ + τ , and solve the model for this case. In
order to find an equilibrium, we first assume it is not optimal for the firm to
invest, and calculate the optimal quantities in a similar fashion to the case
of only irreversible technology. The policy maker’s cap is, thus, her best
response to the quantities in the case where the firm is not investing in the
gas plant, according to her type (h or l). We then assume it is optimal to
invest and repeat the procedure.22 All the equilibrium quantities, e∗i,s, e¯
∗
s
and p∗s, for each of the two cases (NI and IS ), have the same properties as
the ones derived above, and G∗1,s is analogous to the optimal level of coal.
Additionally, we find that in equilibrium, firm 2’s choices of e∗2,s are equal
for both the NI and IS cases. The resulting expected profits for firm 1 are,
therefore,
E[pi1,NI(e
∗
s; e¯
∗
s,NI)] = q[α1,ee
∗
h − ce∗2h − p∗h,NI(e∗h −
e¯∗h,NI
2
)]
+ (1− q)[α1,ee∗l − ce∗2l − p∗l,NI(e∗l −
e¯∗l,NI
2
)] (19)
E[pi1,IS(e
∗
h, G
∗
l ; e¯
∗
s,IS)] = q[α1,ee
∗
h − ce∗2h − p∗h,SI(e∗h −
e¯∗h,SI
2
)]
+ (1− q)[α1,GG∗l − gG∗2l − p∗l,SI(λG∗l −
e¯∗l,SI
2
)] (20)
for s = h, l.23
In order to explore the firm’s investment decision, we need to compare the
two expected profits. However, since the firm is a price taker, it does not
take into account its own effect on the price and the cap. Therefore, when
the company makes its investment decision it does not compare the two
expected profits described above directly.
Our equilibrium is, therefore, constructed in the following manner. We first
assume it is an equilibrium for the representative firm to invest. This means
all the continuum of firms invest, so that the equilibrium cap and price
are e¯∗s,IS and p
∗
s,IS . Then, we check if this is the case; that is, if there
does not exist any profitable deviation. We do so by comparing the profit
22Notice that the cap set by the regulator in equilibrium is different depending on
whether the firm invested or not. Due to market interactions, the optimal level of coal
resulting from firm 2’s profit maximization in this case might also be different from that
of the case where firm 1 does not invest.
23The expected profit for firm 2 is analogous to the previous case.
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of the representative firm when investing (and switching) with that of not
investing, when the cap and the price are those prevailing assuming the firm
is investing:
E[pi1,IS(e
∗
h, G
∗
l ; e¯
∗
s,IS , p
∗
s,IS)]− E[pi1,NI(e∗h, e∗l ; e¯∗s,IS , p∗s,IS)] > 0, s = h, l (21)
We then repeat the procedure assuming it is an equilibrium not to invest,
and compare:
E[pi1,NI(e
∗
h, e
∗
l ; e¯
∗
s,NI , p
∗
s,NI)]− E[pi1,IS(e∗h, G∗l ; e¯∗s,NI , p∗s,NI)] > 0, s = h, l
(22)
Considering, once again, a MPS we find that there is a threshold on F ,
F th, such that, for F < F th firm 1 is better off investing, both when the cap
is e¯∗s,IS and e¯
∗
s,NI , and prices are p
∗
s,IS and p
∗
s,NI . The opposite is true when
F > F th.24
We therefore find a unique equilibrium, given the fundamentals of the econ-
omy, consisting of the equilibrium quantities above, the system of beliefs of
firms, given by q, the threshold for investment and the condition for switch-
ing, determined further below.
Finally, for easiness of interpretation, we analyze the equilibrium imposing
restrictions on some of the parameters that are not central to our analysis.
The calibration procedure is described in Appendix C. With these values,
we plot equations (21) and (22). In Fig.3 we present the graph for the par-
ticular case of γ = 0.5 and φ = 280, which in our framework describe a
policy maker with balanced preferences.
The figure shows that, for F < F th, the firm has a higher profit when
investing in the gas plant, both when the cap is set optimally for this choice
(positive part of the curve representing (21)) and when the cap is set op-
timally for NI (negative part of curve (22)). For F > F th the firm no
longer has an incentive to invest: equation (21) becomes negative, and (22)
positive, meaning that for any of the two caps, the firm is better off not
investing.
The same procedure was followed to find an equilibrium in the case where
the firm never switches to coal, once it has invested (INS ). We find that the
threshold for investing is larger since the company is willing to pay more for
an investment that it is sure it will use. In a similar graph to that of Fig.3,
this corresponds to a jump of the two curves to the right.
To complete the analysis for the reversible technology case, we find the con-
ditions under which the firm switches. We proceed in the same manner as
24We assume that, when indifferent, i.e., F = F th, the firm invests.
19
50
100
150
200
P
r
o
f i
t


-150
-100
-50
0
0 50 100 150 200
P
r
o
f i
t
Fixed Cost FFth =
Figure 3: Investment decision for firm 1
before, by assuming an equilibrium in the last period, and then checking
for profitable deviations. Additionally, and since the regulator can influence
the firm’s decision to switch because the cap is set before this, we compare
her utility under each of the cases, to find unique conditions. We find that
the switching decision depends on a the relative environmental preference
of the regulator weighted by the marginal emission damage:
ϕ =
(1− γ)
γ
φ (23)
In particular, we find a critical point, ϕth, for which the switching decision
depends on τ . Specifically:
1. If ϕ < ϕth, ∀τ whenever firm 1 invests it switches for a high realization;
2. If ϕ > ϕth, the firm switches only if τ > τ th (i.e., if the spread of the
uncertainty parameter is very high).
The effect of uncertainty on this reversible investment depends on the region
of these parameters:
• If we are in the first case (ϕ < ϕth) and the firm always switches, then
increases in the spread of γ˜s (τ) increase the threshold for investing,
F th, so that there is more investment in equilibrium. This effect can
be seen in Fig.2 as a movement of all the curves to the right.
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• Whenever ϕ > ϕth, and τ < τ th, the firm does not switch, and, there-
fore, investing in the gas plant is equivalent to an irreversible invest-
ment.25 Therefore, the effect of uncertainty is negative.26
• Finally, in the case where ϕ > ϕth and τ > τ th, the firm switches
under the high realization of uncertainty, but increases in τ lead to
decreases in investment.
Our results differ from those of Chen and Tseng (2011), where reversible
investment always increases with uncertainty, due to the output effect: be-
cause firms are able to adjust their fuel quantities after uncertainty is re-
solved, they find it more profitable to decrease production than investing in
a gas plant, if there is the possibility of a very low level of the cap, which
follows from the existence of an environmentally-biased regulator (ϕ > ϕth)
and a high level of uncertainty (τ > τ th).
Proposition 3 If firms are allowed to vary their output, reversible in-
vestment increases with uncertainty only for some values of the fundamentals
of the economy.
In a nutshell, if the authority is more biased towards the economy (either
because the marginal damage is high, or γ is low), then uncertainty may have
a positive effect on reversible investment, when it is considered in isolation.
On the other hand, when the policy maker is more environmentally-oriented
(either because γ is very high, or φ is low), uncertainty is never beneficial
for investment.
3.3 Complete Environment
We now turn to the complete model, where both reversible and irreversible
investments are available for the power generating firm, and the latter for
the firm representative of the industrial sector. The procedure for solving is
similar to that of subsection 3.2, but incorporating the first period choices
of ai, as determined in subsection 3.1.
25This result is in line with the analysis of Blyth, Bradley, Bunn, Clarke, Wilson, and
Yang (2007).
26In the analogous graph to the one in Fig.3, but for the comparison between NI and
INS, which we do not present due to space restrictions, the two curves move to the left as
τ increases, decreasing the threshold for investment.
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Firms now have different optimal decisions on the level of clean technol-
ogy according to the discrete reversible investment choice of firm 1: a∗j ,
j = INS, IS,NI. This is because the power sector company adjusts its
level of the irreversible technology, so as to maximize its profit, according
to the productivity associated to the fuel it expects to use. Then, due to
market interactions that affect the prevailing cap, we also allow firm 2 to
decide on diverse levels of investment according to the fuel choices of firm
1, although in equilibrium, we find that they do not differ. This gives rise,
in equilibrium, to three different levels of irreversible investment for firm
1, one for each of the three cases (NI, IS, INS ) and only one for firm 2.
When comparing these results with those of the model in subsection 3.1, we
find that a∗1,INS > a
∗
1;IS > a
∗
1,NI = a
∗
1,isol.
27 This means that the higher the
probability of the firm using gas in production, the higher is the level of a∗1.28
All the comparative statics for the equilibrium levels of the continuous
variables above are maintained. In particular, aggregate investment in the
irreversible technology always decreases with uncertainty, when the latter
follows a mean preserving spread process.
As for the discrete choice of switching, we follow the procedure described
before to find a threshold on (1−γ)γ φ, call it ϕ
th′ , for which the decision to
change fuels once invested depends on τ . Our results confirm that, also
in the full setting, when the government is more biased towards the envi-
ronment, ϕ > ϕth
′
, the power company switches whenever τ > τ th, and
uncertainty always decreases investment in the reversible technology. How-
ever, in the case of a government more incline towards economic activity,
i.e. ϕ < ϕth
′
, where firm 1 decides to switch for any τ > 0 after investing,
the results change when the choice of the irreversible technology is included
in the model. The present scenario is characterized by two features: firstly,
for low levels of uncertainty the firm never invests; secondly, the positive ef-
fect of uncertainty on the reversible investment level, observed in isolation,
vanishes for high levels of τ . Fig.4 depicts the threshold for investment,
F th, as a function of τ for a given ϕ < ϕth
′
and it allows to identify these
outcomes.29 There are four regions of interest and, consequently, three ad-
ditional thresholds for τ . For low levels of uncertainty, τ < τ1, reversible
investment increases with uncertainty as in subsection 3.2 but firms never
invest. This is because, even if F = 0, the firm always has a lower profit
27The level of a∗2 remains unchanged.
28This is because, on average, a1 represents an addition to the productivity of the fuel.
29We again use the calibration described in Appendix C. We set again γ = 0.5 and now
φ = 150, such that the constraint on ϕ is satisfied.
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Figure 4: Investment in Reversible Technology
investing in the gas plant than not investing. This effect can be traced to
the equilibrium behavior of the regulator: the introduction of the possibility
of ai in the firms’ production functions allows the policy maker to lower
the cap, since the same level of production can be attained emitting less
CO2. This lower limit on emissions, in turn, decreases both the equilibrium
levels of e1,s and G1,s which, as set out before, decrease the firm’s expected
profit in different ways. Specifically, the firm’s profit function pi1,G is much
more responsive to changes in Gi,s than pi1,e is to changes in e1,s, so that
∂pi1,G
∂e¯ >
∂pi1,e
∂e¯ . Additionally, this relationship is not linear in e¯: for higher
values of the cap, the variation in profits is higher than for lower ones. Con-
sequently, the introduction of ai leads an economically biased authority to
set a cap for which it is no longer profitable for the firm to invest in a gas
plant. In the case of the more environmental policy maker described above,
however, this effect is not enough to eliminate investment, due to the lower
expected cap associated with this regulator type.
The second region refers to τ1 < τ < τ2, where the power company invests
in the reversible technology and uncertainty maintains the positive effect on
investment found in subsection 3.2 as it represents a means to insure itself
against future potential high permits price.
When τ > τ2, however, uncertainty has a negative effect over investment in
the reversible technology. This is derives from the negative impact of un-
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certainty over the irreversible investment. Since the profit of the firm using
gas is more sensitive to changes in the level of the clean technology, aIS ,
than the the profit when using coal, it decreases faster as aIS diminishes.
This effect now prevails over the hedging motive and reversible investment
decreases with uncertainty. Thus for τ2 < τ < τ3, the firm still invests but
the higher the uncertainty the less the investment made is. Additionally, for
τ > τ3 the firm does not find it profitable to invest, for any fixed cost F.
The following proposition summarizes this result:
Proposition 4 In a comprehensive setting with output variation the
introduction of irreversible investment decisions partly eliminates the possi-
bility of a positive effect of uncertainty on reversible investment found for
governments biased towards the economy.
We further study the second threshold for τ , which is derived as the
value for which ∂piIS∂τ = 0, and captures the point where there is a change in
the sign of the effect that uncertainty has over reversible investment. Fig.5
plots this threshold for different levels of γ and for a given marginal damage
φ = 50.
Figure 5: Threshold for positive effect
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If τ is below the threshold, namely within the shaded area, uncertainty
leads to a higher investment level. On the contrary, for τ higher than the
threshold uncertainty has a negative effect on investment. The triangle de-
limitates the maximum τ possible for each value of γ, so that τ has a positive
effect on reversible investment only in the shaded area under the triangle.
Note that τ2 is increasing with γ. This means that for policy makers more
biased towards the economy,30, the higher their bias, measured by γ for given
φ, the higher the maximum level of uncertainty that stimulates investment.
The main results of the complete model can be summarized in the fol-
lowing table.
Parameters Preferences Uncertainty
Reversible
Uncertainty
Irreversible
ϕ > ϕth
′
Environment Negative Negative
ϕ < ϕth
′
Economy
Positive if τ < τ2 Negative
Negative if τ > τ2 Negative
Table 1: Final effect of uncertainty on investment
In a setting which mimics the real world interaction in investment decisions,
these results mean that if the authority has clear long run environmental
goals such as the Kyoto Protocol, policy uncertainty is not likely beneficial
for any type of investment in low-carbon technology. As described this effect
takes place through two channels: the feedback effect of the regulator and
the interaction with the irreversible clean technology.
Our analysis abstains from any welfare considerations, and focuses solely on
understanding the channels through which uncertainty affects investment.
From a welfare perspective, however, this uncertainty may be beneficial, if
it acts as a stabilizer for the economy, of if the flexibility it entails allows to
adjust to the current state of technological process. Understanding which
effect prevails would require further analysis which is beyond the scope of
this paper.
30Recall that we are in the case of ϕ > ϕth
′
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4 Conclusion
In the context of a carbon dioxide Emission Trading Scheme, we study how
uncertainty over the policy rule, driven by periodicity of the aggregate cap,
affects firms’ investment in low-carbon technologies. We formulate a three
period sequential model that puts together the two sectors regulated by the
European scheme and encompasses both irreversible and reversible invest-
ment possibilities for the firms. Additionally, we explicitly model the policy
uncertainty as the relative priority the regulator puts on economic activity
with respect to environment concerns and we assume that it follows a mean
preserving spread process.
The Real Option Theory results carry over to our enlarged framework as
far as irreversible investment is concerned. Namely, we find uncertainty al-
ways reduces investment levels. Regarding reversible investment taken in
isolation, our results differ with respect to previous literature. Specifically,
allowing firms to change their production ex post provides them with an
additional instrument to cope with uncertainty (output effect), which mit-
igates to some extent the positive effect of uncertainty in reversible invest-
ment. Finally, in a complete setup, we show that introducing the additional
possibility of irreversible investment partially eliminates the potential posi-
tive effect of policy uncertainty on reversible technology. The negative effect
of uncertainty on irreversible investment carries over to the profitability of
the reversible one, so that for higher levels of uncertainty this effect becomes
negative.
To sum up, we find that only when policy makers are concerned primarily
with economic expansion, relative to environmental issues, a small level of
uncertainty might increase reversible investment, by making it a profitable
opportunity. This situation might take place in developing countries, where
often growth concerns relegate environmental issues to the background. On
the contrary, in the case of the European Union, where we observe a higher
environmental awareness, with clear long run green policy goals, policy un-
certainty most likely has a negative effect on all investment in low-carbon
technology. In this case the introduction of commitment mechanisms that
reduce long-term uncertainty would help to create the right incentives to
reach the CO2 reduction target of the policy. These could consist, for ex-
ample, of the setting of a long-term limited range for the cap, which would
be enforceable by law, thereby binding future governments. These mecha-
nisms should however guarantee the minimum flexibility required to adjust
to unforeseen changes of the technological process or to stabilize economic
shocks.
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A number of extensions to the model are currently under implementation,
both as a robustness check, and to further analyze the workings of this mar-
ket. First, in order to verify the robustness of the results, we are in the
process of developing a numerical analysis which uses alternative specifica-
tions for the profit functions of the firms, as well as for the damage function
in the regulator’s problem. Furthermore, we wish to add welfare consid-
erations to the current analysis, using the regulator’s objective function as
proxy for the aggregate welfare. Both ex-ante and ex-post welfare will be
explored to provide normative considerations. The analysis is limited in the
sense that we do not consider additional exogenous shocks in production
which might alter the optimal policy function of the regulator. However,
this would require a dynamic analysis which is beyond the scope of the
paper.
Appendix A: The EU ETS and Policy Uncertainty
Launched in 2005, the EU ETS is a market based approach that relies on
the companies’ cost differential of reducing emissions. The current scheme
involves two sectors: power companies and carbon-intensive industries. In-
dustries covered include factories producing cement, lime, glass, brick, pulp
and paper, oil refineries, coke ovens, iron and steel.31 Each of these in-
stallations receives annually an allocation of permits which corresponds to
the total amount of CO2 it is entitled to emit during the production pro-
cesses. At the end of a specified trading round, each participant is required
to hold permits representing its total emissions for the period.32 Companies
that exceed their quotas are allowed to buy unused permits from those that
have excess supply, as a result of investment in abatement or of reduction in
their production level. These permits are called European Union Allowances
(EUA) and are traded in a specific platform, one EUA corresponding to the
right to emit one ton of CO2. Participants who do not meet this require-
ment are subject to financial penalties.
Until 2008 the authority opted for a grandfathering type of allocation,
namely based on historical emissions levels, but from 2013 the scheme will
move towards an allocation rule based on benchmarking and auctioning.
The total amount of the allocated permits constitutes the cap. Both the
31Petro-chemical and aviation will be part of the scheme in 2012-2013.
32From the second phase of the scheme, firms are allowed to bank and borrow their
permits among different periods and phases of the scheme, namely to smooth the usage
of their permits inter-temporally.
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cap and the allocation are set by the regulatory authority. Until 2008 the
allocation decision was a competence of national authorities through the
National Allocation Plans, while from 2013 this competence has been cen-
tralized at the European level. The authority decides on the level of the
cap period by period but considering long run targets. These periods are
called phases and they differ in length. The three following figures depict for
each of these phases the information available to firms regarding the future
aggregate cap.
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Figure 6: Annual aggregate cap as known in 2003. Source: European Com-
mission.
Directive 2003/87/EC set the goal of achieving an 8% reduction in emis-
sions of greenhouse gases by 2008 to 2012 compared to 1990 levels, and
established a long-run goal of reducing emissions of greenhouse gases by ap-
proximately 70% compared to 1990 levels. The only cap set precisely was
that of the first phase, 2005-2007 (Fig.1). This means that each regulated
firm had to plan its long term investment, which has a payback period es-
timated in around 15 years, without knowing the aggregate cap level, and
therefore its allocation of allowances, from 2008 onwards, but assuming a
tighter cap in the future given the long term reduction goal (-70% compared
to 1990 levels).
In 2007, the cap for the period 2008-2012 was set to 2177MtCO2, thereby
correcting the previously announced one (dashed line in Fig.2). As reported
by the EU Press Release IP/07/1614 of 26/10/2007, the European Commis-
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Figure 7: Annual aggregate cap as known in 2007. Source: European Com-
mission.
sion also made a unilateral commitment that Europe would cut its emissions
by at least 20% of 1990 levels by 2020, to be implemented ”through a pack-
age of binding legislation”. Although this implies a higher commitment of
authorities towards lower emissions, also in this phase economic agents were
uncertain about the cap level after 2012. Moreover the unexpected revision
dictated by the over-allocation from the first phase increased even more the
perceived volatility of the future cap level.
Finally, as shown in Fig.3, for the period 2013-2020, the cap corresponds
to a trajectory. Specifically, it ”will decrease each year by 1.47% of the
average annual total quantity of allowances issued by the Member States
in 2008-2012”, according to directive 2010/634/EU, starting with a cap of
2039MtCO2. However, after 2020, the cap level is still unclear: it is stated
that ”this annual reduction will continue beyond 2020 but may be subject
to revision not later than 2025”. As underlined above, given the long term
nature of low-carbon investments (around 15 years), this uncertainty over
the policy instrument, the cap, may affect aggregate investment.
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Figure 8: Annual aggregate cap as known in 2010. Source: European Com-
mission.
Appendix B: Gas transition in the European power
sector
For the choice of reversible investment we used the possibility for electricity
generating firms to produce with gas or coal, according to which is more
profitable. The following table reports the percentage of coal and gas used
in the production mix of the power sector in different European countries
in 1990 and 2010. Coal is clearly substituted out, mostly by gas, in all the
countries considered. This is not only a feature of the European Union, but
a worldwide trend of employing gas in the electricity generation process.
The reason for this is exactly the switching motive previously laid out.
Percentage of coal and gas in the energy mix (1990-2010)
Coal Gas
1990 2010 1990 2010
Germany 58% 44% 7% 13%
Italy 17% 14% 19% 53%
Spain 40% 11% 1% 32%
United Kingdom 65% 28% 1% 46%
Table 2: Coal and gas in the energy mix. Source: Enerdata and IEA.
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Appendix C: Calibration
We present the parameter restrictions used for the interpretation of the re-
sults. As previously pointed out, this calibration exercise is dictated by the
complexity of the analytical solutions.
Given the richness of information provided by the UK Government De-
partment of Energy and Climate Change, we take the British market as a
benchmark for the calibration of the parameters that are country dependent.
Productivity. We calibrate three different productivity parameters: one
for the power sector when the plant is run by using coal (α1,e), one when
the plant produces by using gas(α1,G), and, finally, one for the industries
sector which produces always by using coal (α2). We consider the productiv-
ity of gas (output per 1000 cubic meters), adjusted for the thermodynamic
efficiency of an average gas power plants, to be equal to 11 MWh/dam3
(calorific value=40). For the coal, the adjusted productivity is set at 6.68
MWh/tonne. As mentioned in Section III, these parameters include also
the price of the output. This means, for instance, that to calibrate (α1,e)
we have to multiply the productivity of a power plant using coal by the
retail price of electricity. For the first two parameters, (α1,e) and (α1,G),
we use the Energy Prices and Taxes Statistics of the International Energy
Agency, and take the annual average UK retail prices excluding taxes (in
pounds per kWh) as a proxy for the price of electricity. Specifically, the
annual average of UK end-of-use electricity price from 2006 to 2010 is 137
Euro per MWh (applying the current exchange rate). For the industrial
sector we choose four industries regulated by the ETS : Steel, Cement, Pulp
and Aluminium,33 and we construct an industrial sector productivity index.
Therefore (α2)is the defined as
∑4
j=1 pjνj , where j is the industry index, pj
is the output price of industry j, and νj is the output per ton of coal ratio
for industry j. Industry data is taken from sector associations while average
output prices are collected from London Metal Exchange. The particular
values follow. Cement UK industry: ν = 0.78, p = 70 Euro/t; Steel UK in-
dustry: ν = 1, p = 400 Euro/t; Aluminium UK industry: ν = 0.7, p = 1800
Euro/t; Pulp EU industry:34 ν = 0.83, p = 480 Euro/t. Summing up,
the three adjusted productivity parameters are the following: α1,e = 339.9,
α2 = 528.25, α1,G = 509.6, and they are consistent with the observed fact
that gas is more productive than coal.
Inputs Cost. As mentioned in previous sections, C(e) and C(G) are the
33The latter will be included in the scheme in 2013.
34Due to absence of pulp production in the UK we use EU data as the ETS is a European
Market.
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operating costs of the fuels and we assume them to be convex in order to
comprise not only the price of fuels, but also the storage and opportunity
costs. As a proxy for c and g, we use UK government statistics on aver-
age prices of fuels purchased by the major UK power producers:35 c = 62
Euro/t and g = 185.9 Euro/dm3.
Emission Factor. λ is the proportion of CO2 emitted by one unit of gas,
as compared to that of one unit of coal. Given that the amount of CO2
generated by one unit coal equals 2.86 ton and the CO2 emitted by gas is
0.0019 t/m3, after the required measurement transformations, we get that
the relative emission produced by one cubic meter of gas is 0.8.
Investment Costs for Irreversible Investment. k2 and k1 represent
the cost that industries incur in to improve their energy efficiency and that
power companies have to pay to invest in renewables, respectively. As evi-
dence suggests that these values differ considerably depending on the tech-
nology, we do not assign any value to these parameters and we let them be
restricted only by the conditions indicated in the Section IV.
Finally note that, given the stylized three period nature of the model, most
of the model parameters do not have a direct correspondent to reality, where
the time horizon is more extend and involves several repetitions of invest-
ment and production decisions.
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